HOT TOPIC: The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and Permitting Physician-Assisted Suicide by Rosenn, Jonathan R.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 51 
Number 3 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Symposium Sponsored by a grant from the Dr. 
M. Lee Pearce Foundation 
Article 13 
4-1-1997 
HOT TOPIC: The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and 
Permitting Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Jonathan R. Rosenn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan R. Rosenn, HOT TOPIC: The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and Permitting Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 875 (1997) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol51/iss3/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
HOT TOPIC
The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting
and Permitting Physician-Assisted Suicide
I. INTRODUCTION ... ...................................................... 875
II. THE NECESSARY PREDICATE FOR A RIGHT: CAN THERE BE A RATIONAL BASIS
FOR SUICIDE
9  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878
III. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PHYSICIAN-AssISTED
SUICIDE ............................................................... 880
IV. THE COMPETING RIGHTS ................................................. 881
A. The Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide ............................. 881
1. COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARISE IN RECOGNITION OF A
RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE ........................... 881
2. IS THERE A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO
ASSISTED SUICIDE?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  886
3. IF THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE, TO WHOM
DOES IT EXTEND? 
.... ........ ......... ....... ...... ....... ....  894
4. DO EXISTING PROHIBITIONS ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE VIOLATE
EQUAL PROTECTION? 
... ...... ......... ....... ...... ....... ...... 896
5. THE RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE WHEN CREATED BY STATE STATUTE... 898
B. Does a State-Created Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide Impinge Upon
Other Fundamental Rights? ......... ............................. 899
1. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ................... 900
2. DUE PROCESS LIFE AND LIBERTY INTERESTS ........................ 901
3. THE RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION ........................ 903
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 904
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether the act of suicide is morally justifiable has long been the
subject of debate. Over many centuries, the positions on the issue have
ranged from absolute condemnation' to absolute approval.2 Where a
particular society's attitude toward suicide falls upon a continuum, and
more importantly, how its laws treat the act of suicide, appear to depend,
at least in part, on how that society conceives of death. Suicide is a very
different act for one who believes in the existence of an afterlife, than
1. In response to the argument that suicide is a morally valid act if committed to avoid sin,
St. Augustine wrote: '"o say this would be monstrous; it follows that suicide is monstrous. If
there could be a valid reason for suicide one could not find one more valid than this; and since this
is not valid, a valid reason does not exist." ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 38-39 (David
Knowles ed. & Henry Bettenson trans., Pelican Books 1972).
2. See GEORGE HowE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 171-182 (1991). Many of the
eighteenth-century rationalists espoused views of this nature. In his essay, On Suicide, David
Hume, the predominant member among them, refuted arguments that suicide was a crime against
nature, against the state, and against God. Id. at 173-75.
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for one who believes only in the existence of this world. Yet, even
among those who believe in life after death, much disagreement exists
regarding the moral justifiability of suicide.
In ancient Egypt, for example, where one's earthly existence was
thought to be a mere precursor to the afterworld, suicide was considered
neither tragic nor shameful.3 Similarly, early Christians viewed suicide
through martyrdom as a means of ensuring their place in the kingdom of
heaven.4 If avoiding sin was the only way to arrive in paradise, then
self-sacrifice in the name of God seemed a practical and sensible step
towards that goal, especially when the temptations on earth for sinning
were greater than many could bear. Interestingly, the present-day Cath-
olic prohibition against suicide was not part of original Christian doc-
trine, and cannot be found in either the Old or New Testament.5 Rather,
scholars can trace it back to the writings of fourth and fifth-century
authors, such as St. Augustine, who wrote in response to the large num-
bers of Christians who killed themselves in the name of God.6 St.
Augustine explained the Catholic Church's designation of sainthood for
certain people who took their own lives by proposing that God most
likely instructed those people to kill themselves.7 While obedience to
God is never a sin,8 suicide without express divine authority is a detesta-
ble and damnable one.
9
Although the present-day prohibition against suicide may have its
roots in religious doctrine, the debate regarding the moral justifiability
of suicide extends well beyond the realm of theology. For example,
there are utilitarian arguments suggesting that suicide is morally superior
to life in certain circumstances. Some societies have approved, and even
encouraged, the act of suicide by individuals who constituted a burden
on that society."° Conversely, utilitarian arguments discouraging suicide
include the idea that every suicide results in a loss of that individual's
contribution to society, an injury to the individual's family and friends,
and a promotion of lawlessness.
3. See id. at 130.
4. See id. at 154, 156-57.
5. See id. at 154.
6. See ST. AUGUSTINE supra note 1, at 26-40.
7. See id. at 36-38.
8. See id. at 37.
9. See id. at 36.
10. See MARGARET PABST BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 98-99 (1982). The extreme
view that a chronically ill person should commit suicide rather than continue to live was forcefully
argued by Friedrich Nietzsche. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE: TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS AND THE ANTI-CHRIST 88 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1961).
11. See BATTIN, supra note 10, at 76-106. For a thorough exposition and critique of these
arguments, see id. at 106-11.
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In the United States today, suicide is less a topic of discussion for
moralists and theologians than it is for the medical community. The
central issue of debate is not so much whether the desire to kill oneself is
morally wrong, but whether it is always a symptom of mental illness. 2
This shifting of the problem of suicide from the realm of religion to
medicine has produced a change in its treatment by legislatures. Puri-
tans in seventeenth and early eighteenth-century England and America
believed that depression or other mental illnesses should not be consid-
ered a defense to the crime of suicide, and that such mental conditions
were merely an indication of diabolical temptation. 3 Early in U.S. his-
tory, in accordance with the common law tradition inherited from Eng-
land, the suicide victim was denied a Christian burial and his bodily
remains were mutilated. 4 Gradually, mental illness became recognized
first as a legitimate defense for the crime of suicide, and eventually as its
leading cause.' 5 Because people who commit suicide are now viewed as
victims of mental illness rather than criminals, today, there are no laws
against suicide in any state in the United States.'
6
Laws do exist in a majority of states, however, that explicitly make
assisted suicide a crime.' 7 In those states that do not explicitly criminal-
ize assisted suicide, such conduct may, nonetheless, be prohibited by
murder or manslaughter statutes.'
8
Oregon is a notable exception. In November 1994, its legislature
enacted a law that decriminalizes assisted suicide under certain condi-
tions. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act creates a right for mentally
competent, terminally ill patients to request physician-assisted suicide,
and contains a number of safeguards designed to protect against
coercion. '9
Both types of statutes-the one in Oregon that permits assisted sui-
cide and the many that prohibit it-encountered constitutional chal-
lenges. A federal district court enjoined the Oregon statute from
enforcement, and declared it unconstitutional.20 In addition, two chal-
12. See id. at 131-53.
13. See HOWARD I. KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND (1989).
14. See Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Suicide in Early America: A Comparison
With the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 57, 76-77.
15. See KUSHNER, supra note 13, at 27-34.
16. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and
Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MEDICINE AND ETHICS 94, 96. Gostin
acknowledges one possible exception to that rule. See id. at 100, n.39.
17. See Andrew Benton, Personal Autonomy and Physician-Assisted Suicide: The
Appropriate Response to a Modem Ethical Dilemma, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 769, 776 (1994).
18. See id. at 776-77.
19. Oregon Death With Dignity Act §§ 2.01, 3.01-3.04 (1994).
20. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
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lenges to the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting assisted suicide
have succeeded at the appellate level. The Ninth Circuit for the U.S.
Court of Appeals, after granting a petition to rehear the case en banc,
recently found a Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide violative
of substantive due process.21 Similarly, the Second Circuit for the U.S.
Court of Appeals, while choosing not to identify a new substantive due
process right, held New York laws criminalizing physician-assisted sui-
cide unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.22 Currently, both
cases are pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.23
In either type of case, the legal issue is inextricably linked to one
medical, ethical, and philosophical question: Is it truly possible for a
mentally competent individual ever to choose to commit suicide? The
existence of a right to assisted suicide, whether a constitutional or a
state-created right, must be predicated upon a belief that suicide can be a
rational act. If it is rational, the legislature might still prohibit the act as
immoral. But if suicide is always irrational, then it would seem
extremely improbable that a court might identify the act as a right.
II. THE NECESSARY PREDICATE FOR A RIGHT: CAN THERE BE A
RATIONAL BASIS FOR SUICIDE?
Some philosophers argue that a desire to commit suicide is never
rational, and is always the product of depression or other mental ill-
ness.24 Such a view, however, fails to take into account the various situ-
ations that may arise in which a mentally competent person may wish to
enlist the aid of a physician in ending her own life.
The following hypotheticals suggest rational suicides: 1) A father
has a son who will die unless he gets a heart transplant. Time is of the
essence, and no compatible hearts are available. The father decides to
sacrifice himself by donating his heart to his son.
2) A killer, faced with a life sentence, elects to die painlessly by lethal
injection.
3) A patient with a chronic illness wishes to end her life, not because of
21. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
23. See; Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36
(1996).
24. See John Donnelly, Suicide: Some Epistemological Considerations, in ANALYSIS AND
METAPHYSICS 283 (Keith Lehrer et al eds., 1975). A similar view is shared by Dr. Carol Gill,
whose affidavit was submitted by plaintiffs in Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1498 (D. Or.
1994) (opinion granting preliminary injunction). Gill claims that up to ninety-five percent of the
people wishing to commit suicide suffer from mental illnesses or emotional disorders. See id. at
1498. n.2.
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physical pain or suffering, but because of the financial burden her costly
treatment places upon her family.
4) A terminally ill patient suffering from an extremely painful disease
decides to end her life in order to escape the pain.
In his article, Suicide: Some Epistemological Considerations, John
Donnelly argues against the existence of rational suicide.25 Donnelly
considers an individual's religious beliefs, as well as the many possible
reasons for wanting to end one's own life, in determining the rationality
of the decision to do so. 26 For purposes of analysis of the hypotheticals
above, however, we are not concerned with people whose religious
beliefs dictate that they will be eternally damned if they commit suicide.
Such a person probably would not be able to do so rationally if she
sincerely believed the result would be eternal damnation.
In the case of the first hypothetical, Donnelly would argue that
regardless of the father's belief in an afterworld, his decision to sacrifice
himself for his daughter is irrational because the guilt his daughter
would experience outweighs the benefit of a prolonged life. Such a
view is speculative, at best. Certainly, the father is in a better position
than the government to determine whether his act will result in his
daughter feeling guilty. Moreover, even if one can somehow balance
the daughter's guilt feelings and the loss of her father against the daugh-
ter's prolonged life, an action based upon poor judgment may, nonethe-
less, be perfectly rational.
In the case of the serial killer, Donnelly would argue that, if he
were committing suicide because he believed he would be better off
dead than incarcerated for a lifetime, the decision would be irrational
because, under a materialistic view of death, a cadaver is incapable of
experiencing psychological states.28 In other words, Donnelly believes
that one can only rationally choose a particular state of existence over
another. For one who does not believe in an afterlife, death is non-
existence, and cannot rationally be chosen.29 If the killer believes in an
afterlife but not hell, the decision is likewise irrational because of the
metaphysical difficulties in the notion of disembodied existence and
individuation.3°
Donnelly's arguments against the existence of rational suicide are
easily dismissed. First, a cadaver's inability to experience psychological
states does not render a person's decision to choose oblivion over pro-
25. See Donnelly, supra note 24.
26. See id. at 286-89.
27. See id. at 294, 296.
28. See id. at 290-92.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 293.
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longed confinement irrational. It is not irrational to choose non-exist-
ence over an extremely unpleasant existence. Second, the mystery that
surrounds the possibility of existence after death does not preclude a
rational decision to terminate life. Choosing an unknown alternative, in
certain circumstances, may be entirely reasonable.
3'
If, on the other hand, the killer is motivated to end his own life by a
sense of altruism, namely that he wishes no longer to have society sub-
jected to his evil deeds, then Donnelly suggests that his act, though
rational, is not suicide, but an act of heroism. 32 This view is more of a
semantic game than an argument. Actions that are profoundly moral are
probably more likely to be rational than irrational. Moreover, the moral-
ity and the rationality of an act are two different issues. Murder, for
example, may be calculated, rational, and entirely immoral. Thus,
although a rational basis for deciding to end one's life is a necessary
foundation for a hypothesized right to die, an act's rationality, by itself,
does not render it a right.
The four previously mentioned hypotheticals are all examples of
rational decisions to end one's life. If the United States Supreme Court
declared that a constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted sui-
cide extended to all mentally competent adults, irrespective of a state's
interest in preserving life, the father would be free to sacrifice his life to
save his daughter, the serial killer could choose a death sentence, the
patient with a chronic illness requiring costly treatment could commit
suicide for economic reasons, and the suffering patient could end her
pain. Important policy reasons exist, however, for limiting the right to
die, and perhaps denying it in each of the hypotheticals. Before examin-
ing the policy implications for a hypothesized right to die, however, we
must consider the various possibilities for the legal treatment of assisted
suicide.
III. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE
Five possible ways of treating the issue of assisted suicide are pos-
sible.33 First, the Court could find that implicit in the Constitution is a
fundamental, unqualified right to die, as long as the person is mentally
31. For a more complete discussion of the rationality of suicide, and the issue of "calculative
rationality" and suicide, see FRED FELDMAN, CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE REAPER, 217-223
(1992).
32. See Donnelly, supra note 24, at 294-95.
33. It is certainly possible to imagine many more than five possible rulings by the United
States Supreme Court, including variations on the scope of a fundamental right, if identified, and
limits upon to whom such right may extend. For purposes of analytical and organizational clarity,
however, I have outlined five basic types of outcomes.
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competent. Laws prohibiting assisted suicide would be constitutional
only as applied to those who used undue influence to manipulate another
into committing suicide.
Second, the Court could conclude that the Constitution contains a
fundamental right to die only in very specific circumstances. Most
likely, the right would extend only to the terminally ill who suffer from
uncontrollable pain. Legislation prohibiting assisted suicide would vio-
late the Constitution only as applied to those whose situations match
specific criteria.
Third, the Court could declare that while the right to die is not a
fundamental constitutional right, existing laws that prohibit assisted sui-
cide violate the right to equal protection. Depending upon the particular
class of people deemed to have been denied equal protection, the state
legislatures could respond either by creating an expansive right to die, or
by prohibiting assisted suicide and/or suicide in any form, for everyone.
Fourth, the Court could maintain that laws prohibiting assisted sui-
cide are constitutional, that there is no fundamental, constitutional right
to die implicit in the Constitution, but that states are free to create such a
right. Under this reading of the Constitution, both statutes permitting
and those prohibiting assisted suicide would be constitutional.
Finally, the Court could find a right to life implicit in the Constitu-
tion, and strike down any statute permitting suicide or physician-assisted
suicide. If the Court held that a right to assisted suicide impinged upon
a right to life irrespective of any procedural safeguards the legislature
could attach to such a right, this would effectively outlaw assisted sui-
cide throughout the country. Alternatively, the Court might hold that in
order to survive constitutional scrutiny, a statute creating a right to
assisted suicide must contain certain procedural safeguards. Such a hold-
ing might leave room for a state-created right to assisted suicide,
although more limited than the one delineated in the Oregon statute.
IV. THE COMPETING RIGHTS
A. The Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide
1. COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARISE IN RECOGNITION
OF A RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
The policy interests served by a limited right to physician-assisted
suicide generally tend to outweigh those that support an absolute ban on
the act. The scale tips in favor of a right to die, however, only when it is
limited. How to limit the right is a difficult and complex problem.
Thus, the problem of legalizing physician-assisted suicide in light of the
policy concerns involved becomes not only a question of whether the
1997]
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legislature should legalize the act, but a question of how the legislature
could regulate it so as to maximize the goals of legalization and mini-
mize its potentially negative effects.
There are at least four major policy considerations in support of the
recognition of a right to physician-assisted suicide, whether constitution-
ally protected or state-created. The first, and arguably most important, is
the interest in ending needless pain and suffering for those with diseases
that offer no chance of recovery. If the elimination of extreme pain is
the principal objective of physician-assisted suicide, however, extending
the right only to the terminally ill appears unsatisfactory. In some cases,
such an interest would be served by extending the right beyond the ter-
minally ill to those with chronic, excruciatingly painful, non-fatal, but
incurable, diseases. 34 Conversely, an extension of the right may not be
desirable for those with terminal but relatively painless illnesses. Per-
haps if doctors developed a means of eliminating or significantly reduc-
ing pain without impairing a patient's quality of life, most patients'
desire to die would disappear. Nonetheless, in the absence of such a
drug or technique, the elimination of extreme pain is an interest that
would be well served by a right to physician-assisted suicide.
Second, the act of suicide is more precise and humane when
assisted by a physician. Some of those who attempt suicide on their own
inevitably fail, often seriously injuring themselves and rendering their
quality of life inferior to what it was before. Even more problematic are
those who wish to commit suicide, but are physically unable to do so.
Many feel compelled to ask relatives or friends to assist them in dying.
Such people are most likely ill-equipped to honor the suicide's wishes,
both technically and psychologically. Moreover, if they comply, they
may be convicted of manslaughter in most states, even though the act
they committed was arguably less morally culpable than those acts nor-
mally categorized as manslaughter.
Third, society has an interest in distributing scarce and costly medi-
cal resources to people who want to live and have a reasonable chance
of recovering from illness. While, ideally, one should never have to
balance human life against economic interests, only in an imaginary
society will resources be unlimited. Thus, in spite of the lack of consen-
sus in the medical community regarding what is "appropriate treat-
ment,"35 doctors must decide whether it is worthwhile to use extremely
expensive, high-tech medical procedures for patients whose chances of
34. Such illnesses are not mere conjecture. One example is tic doloreaux, an extremely
painful condition of the trigeminal nerve which, while not fatal, is frequently untreatable. See TOM
L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 96 (2nd ed. 1983).
35. DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE 208 (1986).
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recovery are minimal. A right to physician-assisted suicide, especially if
extended to the terminally ill, would provide another option for those
who would needlessly consume precious resources in a futile attempt at
recovery. The preservation of these resources, in turn, would allow their
distribution to people who may truly benefit from them.
Finally, a person suffering from a disease that requires costly treat-
ment may have a legitimate interest in preserving her resources and
those of her family. Given the inaccessibility of high-tech treatment for
the average person, patients may be put in the position of choosing
between a chance for life and the prevention of their family's impending
bankruptcy. Depending upon the person's chances for a cure and the
cost of treatment, the preservation of the family's financial resources
may be a legitimate concern. If the concern is legitimate, the need for a
right to assisted suicide becomes compelling when the person suffers
from a disease that is especially painful. Although, in the absence of a
right to assisted suicide, the patient may still refuse the costly treatment
and await a "natural" death, forcing a patient with a painful disease to
choose this route seems cruel; the patient has no hope for recovery and
may have to wait in extreme pain for months before natural death
arrives.
Just as the elimination of pain is only a relevant concern when the
right to assisted suicide is extended to those who suffer from painful,
incurable diseases, some of the policy concerns for opposing the recog-
nition of a right to physician-assisted suicide tend to disappear when the
right is extended only to a group such as the terminally ill, or is couched
in procedural safeguards. The first concern is that a right to physician-
assisted suicide may facilitate murder under the guise of suicide. Physi-
cians, and other people who would profit financially from a person's
death, could conspire to murder the person, asserting the statute as an
affirmative defense to any action brought against them. Such a possibil-
ity is practically non-existent if the state requires multiple manifestations
of the person's consent in the presence of witnesses, along with certifi-
cation by two or more physicians that the person is terminally ill.
A second argument for opposing the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide is that it is contrary to the very purpose of the medical
profession to cast doctors in the role of killers, even at their patient's
request. The Hippocratic Oath, that all medical doctors promise to
uphold, contains such a prohibition, as the physician vows to "never do
harm to anyone" or "prescribe a deadly drug" to anyone if asked for it.36
While protecting and preserving human life may be the primary
36. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 716-17 (25th ed. 1990).
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purpose of the medical profession, doctors must balance such a goal
against countervailing considerations. An equally important principle
for doctors is respecting patient autonomy.37 The legal doctrine of
informed consent, which emerged from common law battery, 8 has
undoubtedly helped shape this principle. 39 Currently, the importance of
patient autonomy appears to outweigh the goal of preserving life only
when a patient refuses treatment, while the reverse is true when the
patient asks for a physician's assistance in dying.4" If one discards the
distinction between active and passive dying as legally and morally irrel-
evant, however, then such balancing needs reformulation. Also, consid-
ering that terminally ill patients are often given pain killers that both
hasten their death and mitigate their suffering,4' one can see that current
medical practice does not reflect a literal reading of the Hippocratic
Oath.42 The elimination of suffering is an objective for doctors that may
conflict with, and at times, outweigh the prolongation of life.
A third, more troubling concern is that a right to assisted suicide
would put patients whose medical treatment consumes their family's
resources under undue pressure to elect to end their own lives. Herein
lies the difficulty in ensuring that the decision to die remains truly vol-
untary. One could characterize a patient's decision to relieve his family
of an economic burden, for example, as a response to coercive economic
pressures, rather than as a voluntary desire to die.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of such a characterization,
whether a decision is voluntary depends upon how broadly one defines
the word. A person's decision to seek employment, for example, is most
likely prompted, at least in part, by economic pressures or incentives,
and yet few would find such a decision morally objectionable. Merely
applying conclusory labels does not help us determine which motiva-
tions for committing a particular act are legitimate. Thus, characterizing
a person's decision to end her life for economic reasons as "involuntary"
amounts to no more than a simple assertion that, as a matter of morality,
financial motivations should not enter into a decision to commit suicide.
Conversely, a decision motivated by economic concerns may be charac-
37. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 34, at 59-102.
38. See Halle Fine Terrion, Note, Informed Choice: Physicians' Duty to Disclose Nonreadily
Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 491, 498 (1993).
39. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 34, at 66-70.
40. See Hans Jonas, Ph.D., The Right to Die, in BIoETHICS 195, 202-04 (Thomas A. Shannon
ed., 1981).
41. See id. at 202.
42. How much weight the medical community should give a literal reading of the Hippocratic
Oath is debatable, especially considering that the teachings of Hippocrates are wholly inconsistent
with the doctrine of informed consent. Hippocrates taught that the physician should conceal the
patient's condition from him. See Terrion, supra note 38, at 496.
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terized as voluntary by analogizing it to a sale; the patient might relin-
quish her life for the preservation of her family's resources, just as she
might sell a house or car for the same reason.
Margaret Radin, in her article Market-Inalienability, discusses the
legal and ethical problems in determining which goods or services
should be bought and sold on the market. 3 Radin takes the position that
in an ideal world, certain things too closely connected with personhood,
such as sexuality, children, and genetic material, should not be bought
and sold on the market." The sale of such personal goods is harmful to
the seller because it strips her of things that are essential to personhood,
and makes fungible, and hence inferior, that which, if not commodified,
would be unique and personal.4"
Radin, however, does not confine her discussion to the ideal.46 She
recognizes that in a world plagued by poverty, racism and sexism,
prohibiting the sale of those goods and services too closely connected
with personhood may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the plight of
the seller.47 Radin labels such a situation "the double bind."48 Unless
the seller is provided with the resources for which she is willing to
exchange a particular aspect of her personhood, prohibiting its sale adds
only insult to injury. Without an effective welfare system, for example,
a legal prohibition on prostitution has at least two likely results. First,
poor women who would otherwise become prostitutes forego essential
goods and services or engage in labor that they consider more oppres-
sive than selling sexual services. Second, poor women prostitute them-
selves illegally, in spite of the adverse conditions imposed by a black
market.49
For Radin, the existence of the double bind does not automatically
result in the conclusion that the sale should be legal.50 Rather, Radin
concludes that in determining whether the sale of a particular aspect of
personhood should be prohibited, the legislature should weigh the harm
to the sellers and society caused by commodification and its accompany-
ing market rhetoric, against the deleterious effects of the double bind.5
Comparing a legal prohibition on prostitution in the absence of an
effective welfare system to a legal prohibition on physician-assisted sui-
43. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
44. See id. at 1905-06, 1910.
45. See id. at 1905-06.
46. See id. at 1915-17.
47. See id. at 1915, 1921-22.
48. Id. at 1915-17.
49. See id. at 1916-17, 1921-22.
50. See id. at 1925-28.
51. See id.
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cide in the absence of an effective health care system yields fruitful
results. Admittedly, the analogy is in some ways imperfect. Character-
izing assisted suicide as a sale when the act is done for economic rea-
sons may appear strained, especially given the conspicuous absence of a
buyer. Yet, in more important ways, the situation is analogous. First,
nothing could be more harmful to personhood than the alienation of life
itself. Second, a poor patient who would otherwise want to live, but
contemplates suicide because of the cost of medical treatment to her
family is in a double bind. Assuming the patient is physically unable to
take her own life, a legal prohibition on assisted suicide in the absence
of an adequate health care system serves only to aggravate her dilemma;
she can either watch helplessly as her family's scant resources are
quickly consumed, refuse treatment and await her death, possibly in ago-
nizing pain, or she can try to persuade another to commit the act despite
its illegality, and the accompanying risk of potentially long-term impris-
onment. Just as conditions for prostitutes are worsened in a black mar-
ket, a patient seeking to commit assisted suicide despite its illegality
confronts numerous difficulties. Given the high risks involved in com-
mitting a felony, the chances are slim that the person who agrees to help
the patient will be a neutral, disinterested party, such as a physician.
Instead, the patient is more likely to seek and obtain the help of family
members who may be unable to end her life in a humane, painless fash-
ion. Even more disturbing and undesirable is the likelihood that those
who assist the patient in taking her life are the ones whose resources are
being consumed, and who are exerting pressure, whether consciously or
unconsciously, upon the patient to die. 2
2. IS THERE A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT
TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE?
Arguments that support identifying a fundamental constitutionally
protected right in physician-assisted suicide are both numerous and per-
suasive. Nonetheless, conceptual difficulties abound when one attempts
to delineate the contours of this right. Given the extreme unlikelihood
that a constitutional right to assisted suicide exists for all mentally com-
petent adults, and the complexities involved in determining to whom
52. The question of how to amend our health care system so that people would not be forced
to choose between assisted suicide and the depletion of their resources is, of course, an extremely
complex problem. These complexities are further compounded by the emergence of expensive,
new technologies and the lack of consensus in the medical community regarding what is
appropriate treatment, especially for the terminally ill. For a discussion on the impact that the
costs of health care have on the quality of care for the terminally ill, see HUMPHRY, supra note 35,
at 204-17.
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such a right should extend, any attempt by the Court to identify such a
liberty interest would most likely resemble judicial legislation.
There are at least two possible avenues through which a fundamen-
tal right to assisted suicide may be found implicitly in the Constitution.
The first is a substantive due process right in personal autonomy or pri-
vacy. The second is a logical extension of the substantive due process
right to refuse medical treatment as discussed in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health."
When supporting a substantive due process right, one can argue
that the right to assisted suicide is part of a broader liberty interest and
right to privacy. In this context, this right is analogous to the right to
abortion, as well as other rights involving personal choices. The district
court in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 4 in finding a right to die
implicit in the Due Process Clause, quoted the following from Planned
Parenthood v. Casey:
[T]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State. 5
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district court's opinion and
identifying a substantive due process liberty interest, also defined the
interest broadly as a right to determine the time and manner of one's
death, as opposed to a right to receive aid in killing oneself.56 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that a decision of a terminally ill person to end his
own life is so intimate and personal, that the power to choose or refuse
such an option should be removed from the hands of the government,
and placed in the hands of the people. 57
Just as the due process liberty interests in right-to-die and abortion
cases bear similarities, the competing state interests also invite compari-
son. Notably, the state's interests, both in abortion and right-to-die
cases, fluctuate in accordance with varying physical and medical cir-
cumstances.58 Even more importantly, however, one can cogently argue
53. 497 U.S. U.S. 261 (1989).
54. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
55. Id. at 1459.
56. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996).
57. See id. at 839.
58. See id. at 800. The Ninth Circuit also found that the constitutional right to an abortion
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that in instances where the right to die is extended only to the terminally
ill, the state's interest in abortion cases in preserving the life of the fetus
at any stage is more compelling than the state's interest in preserving the
lives of those with no hope of recovery who wish to live no longer.
The second avenue through which one could find a right to assisted
suicide implicit in the Constitution is in the logical extension of the con-
stitutionally protected right to refuse medical treatment identified in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.59 The Court first
acknowledged that various lower state and federal courts had found sup-
port for the right, both as a corollary to the common law doctrine of
informed consent and as a right to privacy. 60 The Court then stated that
the right is a due process liberty interest that can be traced to prior U.S.
Supreme Court decisions.61 Such decisions included cases in which the
Court held that a person has a liberty interest in refusing a smallpox
vaccine; that prisoners have an interest in refusing unwanted antip-
sychotic drugs; and that children have a liberty interest in not being con-
fined unnecessarily for medical treatment.62
As the Court in Cruzan explained, however, identifying a liberty
interest does not end the Court's inquiry. 63 One must balance the indi-
vidual's interest against the state's interest to determine whether the
state has unconstitutionally impinged upon that right. Thus, in order to
declare prohibitions on assisted suicide unconstitutional, one must main-
tain that the right to refuse treatment, even when such refusal results in
death, would outweigh any compelling state interest in preserving life.' 4
and a possible right to die were similar in that both liberty interests are not static, but fluctuate in
strength as medical and physical circumstances change. Such reasoning is problematic, as the
balancing process in determining whether a statute sufficiently impinges upon a liberty interests so
as to be unconstitutional would be even more complicated were both the liberty interests and the
state interests deemed to fluctuate. Furthermore, the argument that the state interest in preserving
life weakens when one becomes terminally ill, while not invulnerable to criticism, is more
conceptually sound than the argument that one has a stronger liberty interest in self-determination
when one becomes terminally ill.
59. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1989).
60. See id. at 270-75.
61. See id. at 278.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 279.
64. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1498 (D. Or. 1994) (granting an order for a
preliminary injunction on December 27th, 1994). Judge Hogan misstates the limitation of the
right outlined in Cruzan: "The Supreme Court held that a competent person has a liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment, but stopped short of deciding that such a person had a
constitutionally protected right when death was the likely result." Id. The Court assumed the
right exists for the sake of argument. Nonetheless, the hypothesized right exists even if the refusal
of treatment will result in death. The unanswered question is whether the Supreme Court, in
balancing the right against a State's interest in preserving life, would find that the right prevailed.
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
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Although Cruzan involved the right to die of an unconscious
woman on life support systems, the issue before the Court was the con-
stitutionality of a Missouri statute requiring a standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence of a person's desire to be withdrawn from life support
before that person's family could request such withdrawal. 65 Thus, the
Missouri statute acted as a procedural limitation on a constitutionally
protected substantive right to refuse medical treatment. Although the
cases that Chief Justice Rehnquist cites in identifying the right to refuse
treatment involved situations in which such refusal would not necessar-
ily result in death, the Court assumed, for the purposes of the case, that
the right exists even when the person would certainly die without treat-
ment.66 The issue left unresolved by the Court, however, was when such
a right could be outweighed by a sufficiently compelling state interest.67
The variability of a state's interest in preserving life is problematic.
The case law fails to clarify if the state's interest diminishes as the qual-
ity of life decreases. Cruzan suggests that it does not,68 as the ruling
required that the hospital keep Nancy Cruzan alive although she had
virtually no chance of ever regaining consciousness. 69 Some have sug-
gested that the state interest diminishes as proximity to natural death
increases.70 Proximity to death by itself, however, should not be enough
65. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87.
66. See id. at 279. Chief Justice Rehnquist states:
Although we think the logic of the cases discussed above would embrace such a
liberty interest, the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of such treatment
would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest is
constitutionally permissible. But for purposes of this case, we assume that the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. Id.
67. See id. at 279. Chief Justice Rehnquist further asserts: "But determining that a person
has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether
respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty
interests against the relevant state interests."' Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307.
321 (1982)).
68. Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Cruzan regarding this point has faced criticism.
Ronald Dworkin proposes that the state has absolutely no interest in preserving the life of a human
being in an irreversibly insensate, vegetative state. Such a life, according to Dworkin, has no
value to anyone. See Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, in MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY: A READER 685-88 (John H. Garvey & T. Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 1994).
Although Dworkin's viewpoint suggests that the state's interest in preserving life fluctuates
as a person's quality of life increases or decreases, perhaps the Cruzan dilemma is better
conceptualized as a problem in defining where life ends. If brain death is the equivalent of death,
and the ability for consciousness remains a necessary part of life, then one could argue that the
state has an equal interest in protecting the lives of all those who are "alive." For a brief
discussion on the problems in determining death, see Daniel Maguire, The Freedom to Die, in
BioETHics 211-12 (Thomas A. Shannon ed., 1981).
69. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
70. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 837 (9th Cir. 1996); see also In Re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
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to weaken the state's interest in protecting life. Such an approach would
suggest that the state has a lessened interest in protecting the lives of the
elderly as compared to the rest of the population. Nonetheless, if the
case can be made that a state's interest in preserving life fluctuates, one
could argue persuasively that the interest is significantly weakened when
those whom the law seeks to protect no longer wish to live.
Putting aside the issue of balancing the individual's liberty interest
against the state's interest, constructing an argument for a constitutional
right to assisted suicide requires consideration of whether the distinction
between acts and omissions is meaningful in this context. To assert that
a constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide is a logical extension
of the right to refuse medical treatment, one must maintain that for con-
stitutional purposes, there should be no difference between dying by
refusing treatment and dying by drugs proscribed by a physician.
A strong case may be made for the proposition that the act/omis-
sion distinction should be discarded here. First, modem case law sug-
gests that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is part of a
broader right to be free from governmental interference in making fun-
damental personal decisions.71 The decision to end one's own life is no
less personal or fundamental solely because of the means by which one
chooses to die. "Patients request physician-assisted suicide for the same
reasons that they refuse life-saving treatment: they want control over
when and how they die."72 If the right to refuse medical treatment is
based upon a right to personal autonomy and self-determination, it is
only logical that such a right be extended to include a right to die by
active, as well as by passive, means.
Moreover, distinguishing between acts and omissions often
becomes a matter of semantics. 73 A patient's decision to die by not eat-
ing or drinking may be characterized as actively starving or passively
refusing food and water. Turning off a respirator may similarly be char-
acterized as an act or an omission.
Next, the law in many instances imposes the same degree of liabil-
ity for omissions, as for acts. Under the criminal law, for example, a
parent who intentionally causes the death of his or her child by failing to
seek medical treatment, or through suffocation, may be held liable for
murder. Justice Scalia, who vehemently rejects the existence of a con-
stitutional right to suicide, also rejects the active/passive distinction
7 1. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 2021, 2025 (1992).
72. Id. at 2026.
73. See id. at 2028.
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between refusing treatment and requesting aid in committing suicide.74
Scalia notes that at common law, the necessary element to the crime of
suicide was not actively causing one's death, but the conscious decision
to put an end to one's life, whether through active or passive means.75
Although Justice Scalia opposes the identification of a constitutionally-
protected right to end one's life either by active or by passive means, he
recognizes that the focus should not be on how the individual chooses to
die, but on the individual's intent and desire to die.76
Although the moral justifiability of an act does not render it a con-
stitutionally-protected liberty interest, an act or an omission's moral jus-
tifiability is relevant to the issue of whether it should or should not be
legal. Again, the reasons for choosing to die, rather than the means by
which one chooses to die, are essential in determining the moral justifia-
bility of a decision to end one's own life. One can imagine situations in
which refusing medical treatment is less morally justifiable than request-
ing the aid of a physician in dying. One who refuses lifesaving treat-
ment because he believes life is not worth living, for example, is
arguably less morally justified in choosing to die than a patient with no
chance of recovery who requests lethal drugs in order to avoid excruciat-
ing pain.
Finally, finding a distinction of constitutional significance between
acts and omissions regarding a right to die makes little sense if one con-
siders that many of the policy arguments opponents raise against physi-
cian-assisted suicide apply with equal force to a right to withdraw from
life support systems. In both cases, patients may experience pressure to
end their lives from family members bearing the economic burden of
their treatment. Also, both the right to refuse medical treatment and the
right to physician-assisted suicide could conceivably facilitate murder
under the guise of suicide. Finally, the poor are more vulnerable than
the wealthy to economic pressures to end their lives, whether they are
able to do so by withdrawing from life support systems or by actively
ingesting lethal dosages of barbiturates.
One could raise two legal arguments for distinguishing between the
right to refuse medical treatment and the hypothesized right to assisted
suicide. The first is that the right to refuse medical treatment has its
origins in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which do not support a
right to assisted suicide. More precisely, the right to refuse medical
treatment is part of a more general right to be left alone, i.e., a right to be
74. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 296-98.
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free from physical intrusions from the government, and not be com-
pelled by the government to do anything. Such an argument finds some
support in the Court's reasoning in Cruzan, and in Supreme Court cases
allowing prisoners to refuse mind altering drugs.77 Moreover, evidence
of the Court's view toward assisted suicide can be found in Cruzan, as
the opinion mentions laws against assisted suicide in support of the
proposition that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting and pre-
serving human life.78
Although the right to refuse medical treatment may have its origins
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' right to privacy, the right to pri-
vacy has been held to encompass more than merely a right to be left
alone. Cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey79 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird"° establish that the right of privacy includes the right to make
certain fundamental, personal decisions free from governmental interfer-
ence.8" Thus, both a right to assisted suicide and the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, can be viewed properly as protected pri-
vacy interests implicit in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The second problem in arguing that a right to assisted suicide is
implicit in the Constitution is found in Justice Scalia's concurring opin-
ion in Cruzan, where he argues that substantive due process rights are
implicit in the Constitution only if they have traditionally or historically
been protected. Because both suicide and assisted suicide were prohib-
ited early in U.S. history, one could argue that no protected liberty inter-
est could possibly exist.
Justice Scalia's position, nonetheless, does not foreclose the possi-
bility of a right to physician-assisted suicide. First, there appears to be
some dispute regarding the legal treatment of suicide under common
law. In Cruzan, Justice Scalia, quoting from Blackstone, maintained
that suicide was always considered a crime, even in cases where the
victim was "hopelessly diseased."82 Authority exists, however, for the
proposition that even under English law, the taking of one's own life
under certain circumstances was non-culpable.83 The first exception to
culpability occurred when the act was committed in an "abnormal emo-
tional state." While it is not clear whether an abnormal emotional state
77. Id. at 278.
78. Id. at 280.
79. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
80. See Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
81. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 858; Eistenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
82. 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Suicide in Early America: A Comparison
With the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 57,75 (1983).
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in this context is the equivalent of mental illness, such "an emotional
state could be induced by extreme old age, a physical infirmity or disa-
bility, or severe and prolonged pain." 4 Thus, if suicide was not consid-
ered a crime at common law under certain circumstances, one cannot
utilize the prohibition of suicide under the common law as evidence that
the framers never intended to provide a fundamental constitutional right
to die.
More importantly, however, even some of the more conservative
justices on the Supreme Court do not accept Scalia's methodology for
finding substantive rights implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.85 In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed
arguendo that a right to refuse medical treatment exists, even when such
refusal results in death,8 6 despite the common law tradition criminalizing
the act of suicide both through active and passive means.8 7 The opinion
of Justice O'Connor, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.s explicitly rejects
Scalia's method of historical analysis when identifying liberty interests,
asserting its inconsistency with the Court's past decisions.8 9
Even more persuasive, however, is Justice Brennan's dissent in
Michael H. v. Gerald D.9° Justice Scalia refused to find that a biological
father had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in asserting his
right to visit his child when the mother of the child was married to
another man. 9' Justice Scalia reached this decision because of the lack
of historical traditions supporting such a right.92 In contrast, Justice
Brennan noted that using tradition to find support, or the lack of support,
for the existence of protected liberty interests is neither an effective nor
objective means of limiting the meaning of "liberty" under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 93 Justice Brennan explained that tradition "can be as malle-
able and as elusive as 'liberty' itself,"94 and that people cannot always
agree as to which traditions are deeply rooted in our history, and which
traditions are related to hypothesized liberty interests.95
84. Id.
85. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that Justice Scalia "sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty
interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be
somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area.").
86. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
87. See id. at 296-97.
88. Michael H, 491 U.S. 110.
89. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 136-41.
91. Id. at 127.
92. See id.
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3. IF THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE, TO WHOM DOES IT EXTEND?
The scope of an alleged fundamental right to assisted suicide
depends on the different theories of its origin. If the right extends only
to terminally ill patients, then it is best viewed as a broader right to self-
determination or personal liberty, which then must be balanced against
the state's interest in preserving life. More precisely, every mentally
competent person possesses a fundamental liberty interest in self-deter-
mination; however, when an individual seeks to engage in self-determi-
nation by ending her life, this liberty interest outweighs the state's
interest in preserving life only when she becomes terminally ill.
Although logic suggests that a person's right to self-determination
should remain constant from adulthood until death, the conception of a
right to die emerging when one becomes terminally ill suggests that the
state's interest in preserving life weakens as a person's proximity to
death increases.
This view is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. If taken to an
extreme, this proposition would support the position that the state has a
more compelling interest in protecting the lives of the young than the
lives of the elderly. Although one could argue that the state's interest in
protecting life weakens only when a person becomes seriously ill, and
not continuously from birth to death, the fact that a person's days are
numbered should not, by itself, indicate that her life merits diminished
protection from the law. Some may feel legitimately that their last few
days, especially if spent free of significant pain, are especially valuable
and perhaps deserving of heightened protection by the state.
Moreover, the most important purpose in finding a fundamental
right to die is to prevent the government from subjecting people to need-
less pain and suffering when there is no hope of recovery. Perhaps this
right is more accurately analogized to a right to be free from torture than
to a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. In any case, the cate-
gory of "terminally ill" is both over and underinclusive. Some terminal
illnesses may not be particularly painful. Thus, a terminally ill patient
may have no legitimate reason for wishing to accelerate her death.
Alternatively, certain untreatable chronic illnesses that do not threaten
an individual's life are excruciatingly painful.96 One could argue effec-
tively that a chronically ill person in excruciating pain should be
afforded the choice of ending her life free from governmental
interference.
96. As previously noted, one such example is tic doloreaux, a sometimes untreatable and
extremely painful condition of the trigeminal nerve. See supra note 34.
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Finally, the argument that a fundamental right to assisted suicide
extends only to the terminally ill is flawed if that right is viewed as an
extension of the right to refuse medical treatment. The absence of any
limitations on the assumed right to refuse medical treatment that the
Court outlines in Cruzan is a good indication that all mentally competent
adults possess a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment, regardless
of their reason for refusal. If requesting to die with the aid of a physi-
cian is no different from refusing unwanted treatment, then why should
the right to such a request be limited to the terminally ill?
If the existence of pain and suffering rather than proximity to death
is the necessary element to weaken the state's interest in preserving life,
then it would appear that the liberty interest of self-determination pos-
sessed by those suffering from incurable, excruciatingly painful ill-
nesses, would outweigh the state's interest. Even more problematic than
determining when an individual is terminally ill, however, is determin-
ing when that individual is suffering from pain so severe to allow death
as an alternate choice.
Making the degree of pain and suffering a criteria for the creation
of a right to die also places the courts and the legislatures in the position
of making judgments about the quality of life. As evidenced by
Cruzan,97 the Supreme Court is unwilling to make such judgments, and
with good reason. Making judgments about the quality of life could lead
the state to place a higher value on the lives of certain individuals than
on others. If the state's interest in protecting the lives of those in severe
pain is diminished, it might follow that the lives of the deaf and the blind
should also be afforded a lesser degree of protection. Such reasoning
would be consistent with that of the Nazis in their goals to "improve"
the quality of human beings through eugenics.
A third option for the Court would be to expand the right to die to
all mentally competent adults. More precisely, the right to end one's
own life, as part of a broader liberty interest in self-determination, would
outweigh any State interest in the preservation of life, as long as the
decision to commit suicide was made voluntarily, free from undue influ-
ence, by a mentally competent adult.
Although a broadly defined right to die may be more conceptually
sound than one limited to the terminally ill, one might think of very few
instances in which a person who is not terminally ill or suffering from an
extremely painful disease would have a rational reason for needing the
aid of another to end her life. The requirement that the act be rational,
however, is an essential predicate for the recognition of a constitution-
97. 497 U.S. 261 (1989).
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ally-protected or state-created right to assisted suicide. Thus, although
the question of when suicide is rational may appear better answered by
psychologists or metaphysicians than by the legislature or the judiciary,
it is a question that must be answered in order to identify the contours of
a hypothesized right to assisted suicide.
4. DO EXISITING PROHIBITIONS ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION?
At least two equal protection arguments suggest that the present
state law prohibitions against assisted suicide may be unconstitutional,
even in the absence of a constitutionally protected right to die. The first
argument follows necessarily, 98 but could exist independently,99 of an
extension of the hypothesized due process right identified in Cruzan: if
one accepts the proposition that there is no legally significant distinction
between actively choosing to die and choosing to die passively, then the
legislature cannot permit those who are able to end their lives by refus-
ing life-saving medical treatment to do so without also allowing those
who can die only with the assistance of a physician to carry out their
final wish.' 0
Proponents of the second equal protection argument contend that
the legislature, by criminalizing physician-assisted suicide while permit-
ting suicide and attempted suicide, is denying equal protection of the
laws to those who are physically unable to take their own lives. If a
person is free to commit suicide or to attempt to commit suicide with
impunity, then in prohibiting assisted suicide, the legislature is denying
such freedom to those who must enlist the aid of another to die.
The standard of review the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for
statutes challenged as denying equal protection varies. First, statutes
that classify on the basis of a suspect class, i.e., race' 0' and alienage, 0 2
trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, in order for a statute containing a racial
classification to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the statute must serve
a compelling state interest and the classification must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest. 0 3 Second, statutes impinging upon funda-
98. More precisely, an extension of the right in Cruzan, and an identification of the right as
one that is fundamental for equal protection purposes, would heighten the level of scrutiny to strict
scrutiny under an equal protection analysis.
99. Without an extension of the right, the statute is subject only to rational basis review.
100. Such is the position taken by the Second Circuit in Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d
Cir. 1996).
101. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
102. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Strict scrutiny in this instance applies
only to state statutes. Federal statutes that classify on the basis of alienage trigger minimal
rational basis scrutiny. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
103. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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mental rights also trigger strict scrutiny.10 Again, the statute's disparate
treatment of one group of people must serve a compelling state interest,
and the classification must be closely tailored to the purpose of the stat-
ute. Third, gender-based classifications trigger intermediate scrutiny,
and, therefore, must be substantially related to an important governmen-
tal interest to pass constitutional muster.10 5 Finally, laws that neither
impinge upon fundamental rights, nor classify on the basis of a suspect
or quasi-suspect class, must be only rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.10 6 Thus, in defense of either equal protection attack, pro-
ponents of laws that prohibit assisted suicide would have to assert a
rational basis for the disparate treatment.
In opposition to the first equal protection argument, one could
assert several reasons for allowing people to refuse life-saving medical
treatment while preventing others from dying with the aid of a physi-
cian.107 While these distinctions may not be persuasive, they need be
only rational.108 As noted earlier, allowing physicians to prescribe lethal
medication puts them in the role of killers, thus creating a position
inconsistent and irreconciliable with their duty to heal. While one could
argue that a physician who disconnects an artificial respirator is as much
of a killer as one who prescribes lethal medication, the difference is that
in the former case, the underlying illness, having deprived the patient of
his ability to breathe on his own, is the actual cause of death. Perhaps
this distinction can be more accurately described as a moral stance that
physicians can intervene in nature's course only to preserve life, and
never to cause death.
Other rational reasons for making a distinction between killing and
letting die include the risk that someone with an excellent chance of
recovery would elect to die because of a misdiagnosis,"°9 the view that
patients on life support have a greater interest in autonomy due to the
invasive nature of the life support, and the considerable increased diffi-
culty in regulating a right to die once it is extended beyond a right to
104. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
105. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
106. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); but see Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981) (upholding the statute but finding that the classification must
advance a reasonable governmental objective).
107. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-16, Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
108. See Williamson, 398 U.S. at 486-88.
109. Although patients temporarily attached to artificial life support systems could also recover
after being misdiagnosed with a terminal illness, the legislature could rationally, and even
reasonably, conclude that patients who require the aid of a physician to die are more likely to fall
victim to such misdiagnosis.
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refuse life-saving treatment.110
Similarly, the states could generate multiple defenses against the
second equal protection attack. One possible reason for treating physi-
cally debilitated people differently from those physically capable of tak-
ing their own lives is the numerous policy concerns implicated when
another person is involved in taking a life. Some of these policy con-
cerns, such as the fear that legalizing assisted suicide would facilitate
murder under the guise of suicide, could be eliminated. For example,
the legislature could allow people who are physically unable to take
their own lives to do so with restrictions-only through the aid of a
physician and with sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure the per-
son's mental competence and consent.
States could also defend laws that prohibit assisted suicide, in the
absence of laws that prohibit suicide or attempted suicide, by arguing
that there is no other effective way of preventing suicide. The absence
of a criminal penalty for taking one's own life does not so much repre-
sent a freedom to commit suicide, but rather the legislature's view that
suicide prevention is not furthered by criminal penalties for the act.
Prohibitions on suicide and attempted suicide do not deter an individual
from taking or attempting to take her own life. Criminal penalties for
assisted suicide, however, do effectively deter people from helping those
who wish to die, but cannot do so by themselves.
5. THE RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE WHEN CREATED BY A
STATE STATUTE
Even if no constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide exists,
state legislatures may be free to pass laws creating such a right, thereby
effectively regulating physician-assisted suicide, provided the state cre-
ated right does not impinge upon other constitutionally protected inter-
ests. In November of 1994, Oregon passed the first law creating a right
to physician-assisted suicide by enacting the Death With Dignity Act
("DWDA"). I I
The DWDA permits mentally competent adults diagnosed as suf-
fering from a terminal illness; and who have voluntarily expressed a
desire to die, to request medication from a physician for the purposes of
ending their lives." 2 For the purposes of the statute, "terminally ill" is
110. Once again, this last argument suggests the difficulty in delineating the scope of a right to
physician-assisted suicide, whether state-created or constitutionally protected. A right to refuse
treatment, even if such refusal results in death, is less problematic. This is primarily because the
class to which the right adheres to is more easily identifiable, i.e., it consists of those who cannot
survive without medical treatment.
111. Oregon Death with Dignity Act §§ 1.01-6.01 (1994).
112. Id. at § 2.01.
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defined as "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death
within six (6) months.""'13
The DWDA contains a number of safeguards designed to ensure
both that the patient's request to die with assistance is voluntary and that
the patient is mentally competent. The DWDA requires three requests
by the patient, two oral and one written, for a physician to prescribe the
medication.I14 A minimum of fifteen days must elapse between the ini-
tial and the final oral request, whereupon the physician must offer the
patient an opportunity to rescind.1 5 The written request must be signed
in the presence of two witnesses who declare that to the best of their
knowledge the patient is mentally competent and acting voluntarily.'
16
Notably, one of the witnesses must be a person unrelated to the patient,
and at the time of the request, not be entitled to any portion of the
patient's estate. 7 Finally, under the DWDA, a consulting physician
must confirm the attending physician's diagnosis that the patient is ter-
minally ill, and that the patient is both mentally competent and acting
voluntarily.' 
18
A state-created right to assisted suicide poses interesting constitu-
tional problems. First, if there is a due process liberty interest in assisted
suicide implicit in the Constitution, a state statute that narrowly deline-
ates the right may, like the statutes prohibiting assisted suicide in all
forms, be an unconstitutional infringement upon such a right. However,
if a constitutional right to assisted suicide does not exist implicitly in the
Constitution, then the state statute may unconstitutionally impinge upon
other rights, such as equal protection, due process life and liberty inter-
ests, and freedom of religion.
B. Does a State-Created Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide Impinge
Upon Other Fundamental Rights?
Shortly after the DWDA was passed, a group of terminally ill
patients, a residential care facility, and operators of residential care facil-
ities succeeded in persuading a federal district court in Oregon to declare
the law unconstitutional,' 19 and permanently enjoin its enforcement.1 20
113. Id. at § 1.01 (12).
114. Id. at § 3.06.
115. See id. at § 3.08.
116. See id. at § 2.02.
117. See id. at § 2.02(2)(a), (b).
118. See id. at § 3.02.
119. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1438 (D. Or. 1995).
120. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (court granting declaratory and permanent
injunction).
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They claimed that the DWDA violated the right to equal protection and
due process life and liberty interests of the terminally ill, as well as the
residential care plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion.
21
1. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The plaintiffs' first claim was that the DWDA deprived the termi-
nally ill of equal protection of the Oregon criminal law.1 22 Because the
statute exempted from criminal liability those who assisted the termi-
nally ill in committing suicide, the terminally ill plaintiffs claimed that
the law did not offer them the same protection from assisted suicide as
those who were not terminally ill.'2 3 More specifically, they claimed
that they might become depressed or subject to undue influence, and
ultimately choose physician-assisted suicide despite their unwillingness
to do so at the time they brought the action. 24
The court, in striking down the DWDA, began its equal protection
analysis by declaring the level of scrutiny it used in reviewing the stat-
ute. The court articulated accurately the standard for minimal, rational
basis scrutiny. The opinion stated: "Legislation is presumed valid if a
classification drawn by a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."' 25 The court further explained that it must uphold the statute
provided "there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification."' 12 6 Since the remainder of
the opinion fails to state that the law impinges upon a fundamental right
or involves a suspect classification, one would expect the court to
uphold the statute, provided it found that the classification of "terminally
ill" was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
The state defendants asserted that the statute served several legiti-
mate state interests. These included avoiding unnecessary pain and suf-
fering, preserving and enhancing the right of competent adults to make
their own critical health care decisions, preventing less humane and dig-
nified suicides and attempted suicides, protecting the terminally ill from
financial hardships, and protecting the terminally ill from unwanted
intrusions into their personal affairs.' 27 Avoiding unnecessary pain and
suffering is, undoubtedly, a legitimate state interest. Thus, the issue
under equal protection analysis should have been whether it was rational
121. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. at 1431.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1433.
124. See id. at 1433-34.
125. Id. at 1432 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, (1981)).
126. Id. (citing F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 308 (1993)).
127. See id. at 1434.
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for the Oregon legislature to presume that the terminally ill, as a class,
are more likely than others to experience pain and suffering, and
whether giving the terminally ill the option of seeking the aid of a physi-
cian in ending their lives would help to eliminate such pain and suffer-
ing. Under this kind of analysis, the statute was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest and should have survived judicial review.
Curiously, the court chose to frame the equal protection issue dif-
ferently. It asserted that for the statute to be rational, it must have suffi-
cient safeguards to justify treating the terminally ill differently from
others. 2 The court then went on to conclude that the DWDA did not
have sufficient procedures to distinguish the mentally competent from
the incompetent, thus ensuring that those expressing a desire to die were
capable of giving their consent.
1 29
While the court's concern for adequate safeguards was legitimate,
its analysis resembled one of procedural due process rather than equal
protection. The court did not really question whether the statute's classi-
fication was rationally related to a legitimate purpose, but whether the
state could authorize a physician to take a terminally ill patient's life
without sufficiently establishing that person's consent. If the statute's
procedural safeguards were inadequate, then the. statute should have
been declared unconstitutional not because the classification of termi-
nally ill was unrelated to a legitimate state interest, but because it
deprived the terminally ill of life without adequate due process.
2. DUE PROCESS LIFE AND LIBERTY INTERESTS
The district court, in its final opinion, chose not to reach plaintiffs'
Due Process and First Amendment claims. The following discussion
expounds the issues insofar as they were discussed in the court's opinion
granting a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs' second claim had two
prongs. First, they argued that the Oregon statute unconstitutionally
deprived the terminally ill of procedural protections for their right to
live.' 30 Second, plaintiffs asserted that the statute deprived them of a
liberty interest in self-determination and personal autonomy in its failure
to ensure that the choice to end life would be informed and voluntary.' 3'
The constitutional rights asserted were derived from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs correctly pointed out that the statute may not have
128. See id. at 1434-37.
129. See id.
130. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (D. Or. 1994) (granting preliminary
injunction on December 27th, 1994).
131. See id.
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possessed sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that a patient's
choice to end life was not the product of judgment-impairing depression.
Section 3.03 of the statute provides that if the attending physician or the
consulting physician suspect the patient is suffering from depression or
another mental illness, they must refer the patient to psychiatric counsel-
ing.1 32 The attending or consulting physicians, however, may not pos-
sess sufficient expertise to identify such a condition. Thus, requiring a
patient who wishes to end her life with the aid of a physician to first
undergo a psychiatric examination would help to ensure that she is men-
tally competent to make such a choice.
Again, plaintiffs' due process life and liberty claim raised the prob-
lem of determining mental competence and identifying depression.
Unfortunately, as psychologists possess different views on the rationality
of suicide, with some adopting the view that a desire to commit suicide
is almost always the product of depression, 133 the ability to exercise
one's right to die under a statute may be dependent upon the particular
philosophy of a psychologist.
A possible weakness, however, in the plaintiffs' Due Process claim
was the lack of state action. If the DWDA had been enforced and the
plaintiffs lost their lives, they would have done so at the hands of pri-
vate, as opposed to state actors. Although the doctors' actions would
have been subject to regulation by the state, that fact alone, does not
convert their action into state action.1 34 Thus, the relatives of the
deceased could not have successfully brought suit against the doctors for
depriving their patients of life without due process.
Whether or not the DWDA itself violated the procedural due pro-
cess rights of the terminally ill, however, is another matter. If one char-
acterized the DWDA as a mere repeal of the law that "protected" the
terminally ill from those willing to help them commit suicide, then such
a repeal would arguably not constitute state action. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated in DeShaney v. Winnebago City Department of Social
Services: 1
35
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on
the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels
of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals
of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its lan-
guage cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation
132. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act § 3.03 (1994).
133. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. at 1498 n.2.
134. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
135. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm
through other means.
136
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has found stat-
utory or constitutional authorization of private activity to constitute state
action.1 37 In Reitman v. Mulkey,138 the Court held that a constitutional
amendment prohibiting fair housing legislation and authorizing private
discrimination in the sale of homes constituted state action. In this case,
the legislature appears even more entangled with private conduct than in
Reitman. The Oregon legislature is not merely legalizing physician-
assisted suicide for anyone who may choose it, but rather it is regulating
and extending it only to the terminally ill under limited circumstances.
Whether the legislature in Lee was a state actor for purposes of due
process may depend in part upon the characterization of the freedom to
commit physician-assisted suicide as a right or a deprivation. 39 In
many ways, the problem of characterizing the DWDA as employing
either state action or inaction is similar to the act/omission distinction
discussed earlier. Although the consequences are the same, the constitu-
tionality of the statute hinges upon the distinction. Assuming that the
DWDA lacks sufficient safeguards to ensure that patients' decision to
opt for suicide will be voluntary and not the product of depression, it
would appear that the legislature is in effect depriving certain individu-
als of life without sufficient due process.
3. THE RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The residential care plaintiffs asserted the final constitutional chal-
lenge to the DWDA. These health care workers claimed that the
DWDA requires complicity on their part that is inconsistent with their
religious beliefs, thereby violating their right to free exercise of religion
under the First Amendment.140 The drafters of the DWDA, however,
apparently foresaw such a problem. In Section 4.01(2), the legislature
provided: "No professional organization or association, or health care
provider, may subject a person to censure, discipline, suspension, loss of
license, loss of privileges, loss of membership or other penalty for par-
ticipating or refusing to participate in good faith compliance with [this
Act]."' 4  Plaintiffs contend, however, that the Oregon law, nevertheless,
requires health care providers to transfer records at a patient's request if
136. Id. at 195.
137. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
138. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
139. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1496-97 (D. Or. 1994).
140. See id. at 1500.
141. Oregon Death With Dignity Act § 4.02(2) (1994).
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the facility is unwilling to comply with the patient's request, and
requires, in conjunction with Oregon's informed consent law, discussion
of physician-assisted suicide as an available treatment option for
patients. 4 2 Such requirements, however, do not seriously interfere with
health care workers' ability to practice their religion, especially when
such minimal interference is weighed against the state's interest in elimi-
nating needless pain and suffering.
V. CONCLUSION
The recognition of a fundamental, constitutionally protected inter-
est in physician-assisted suicide, while not wholly untenable, is fraught
with difficulties. If a fundamental right to assisted suicide exists implic-
itly in the Constitution, how can the Court justify extending the right
only to the terminally ill? The Court could assert that the right exists for
all mentally competent adults, but this right is outweighed by the state's
interest in preserving life until a person becomes terminally ill, as the
state's interest in preserving life weakens upon proximity to death.
Nonetheless, the implications of such a path are such that the Court
would undoubtedly steer clear of it.
As an extension of the right to refuse medical treatment identified
in Cruzan, the right to physician-assisted suicide suffers from conceptual
flaws. If a right to assisted suicide is truly an extension of the right to
refuse treatment, then it would follow logically that both rights be simi-
lar in scope and available to all mentally competent adults. Important
policy concerns, however, dictate that the Court avoid such a finding.
Also, in Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the assisted suicide
laws as an example of the State demonstrating its interest in preserving
life. 4 3 Finally, the right to refuse medical treatment may be distin-
guished from a hypothesized right to assisted suicide in that the former
has its origins in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' guarantee of pri-
vacy, or a right to be left alone, and not be compelled by the government
to do anything.'44
Recognition of a state-created right, on the other hand, poses fewer
conceptual difficulties and would allow the states individually to con-
struct procedural safeguards ensuring that a right to die would not
impinge upon fundamental rights. Given the importance of the policy
concerns that such a right implicates, and the uncertainty and unpredict-
ability of results that state-regulated, physician-assisted suicide would
142. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. at 1500.
143. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1989).
144. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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produce, allowing the states to create and limit the right as they see fit is
the most sensible alternative.
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